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IN MEMORIAM.
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On Sunday, May 20, the whole community was shocked to learn
of one of the most dastardly crimes which has been perpetrated in
Philadelphia. The evening before, while on his way home from
his university duties, Roy Wilson White, Fellow of the Department
of Law of the University, was attacked by footpads and beatento
death. The motive was robbery. The feeling of gloom among
University men at this terrible crime was heightened by the very
close relations which Mr. White sustained to the officers, faculty and
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students. He bad been a student of the Department of Law for
three years, and a valued instructor for two more, so that he was
intimately known to all coniected with this school.
Roy Wilson White was born June 6, 1872, at Richmond, Ind.,
and was the son of William M. White and Mary White. His
father was a school teacher.
His preparatory education was received at various private schools
in Adrian, Mich., and Louisville and Spiceland, Ind. His under-
graduate college education was received at Earlham College, Rich-
mond, Ind., where both his mother and father had graduated.
While at Earlham he was president of the Ionian Literary Society,
and won the college oratorical prize in his senior year. He also
represented Earlham in 1895 in the intercollegiate oratorical contest
at Indianapolis. He graduated in 1894 as a Bachelor of Science,
and came east to Haverford College, where he spent a year in post-
graduate work in Latin, receiving the degree of Master of Arts.
He then entered the Law Department at Pennsylvania, and from
the first showed remarkable ability. He stood among the leaders of
his class throughout his course, and took honors all three years, gradu-
ating in 1898. He received the Meredith Prize for his graduating
essay, entitled "Some Phases of Government Regulations of Con-
tracts."
During his course in the Law School he found time to do a great
amount of private tutoring, and was, for the greater part of that time,
on the teaching force of the Episcopal Academy, Philadelphia.
During his first year he passed the Indiana State Bar examination,
and was admitted to that Bar. In 1896 he was chosen alternate for
the team that debated with Cornell, and in 1897 wias a member of
the Pennsylvania debating team.
While in the Law School Mr. White was a member of numerous
legal clubs, notably the Sharswood Law Club and the Phi Delta Phi
legal fraternity. He was the first president of the Pennsylvania
Debating Union.
As a Fellow of the Law School Mr. White was entrusted with a
considerable amount of the work of instruction, and fulfilled his
duties so satisfactorily that'he was commissioned to go abroad last
year to study the civil law, and was to have given instruction in
that subject during the coming year.
Since he was sixteen years of age he had, together with his
brother, been the support of a mother and four sisters.
A glance at the above outline of the brief career of Roy Wilson
White will suffice to show that he was a man out of the ordinary,
who was destined in any chosen walk of life to stand head and
shoulders above his fellows. No better commentary on his charac-
ter could be penned than the simple narration of his past life and
achievements.
Whether he had elected to devote his life to teaching law
or to its active practice, he could not have failed to make his mark.
To those who knew him it is needless to speak of his intellect or of
his character. As a man he was all that a true man and a good
citizen should be. He was not, like most ambitious men, selfish, but
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open-handed to all, and self-sacrificing to the last degree for his
family and friends. No labor was too arduous for him to undertake
for those of whom he was fond. No student ever came to him for
help and went away without receiving kind and patient attention
and assitance from one who himself hardly knew the meaning of
intellectual difficulty.
Roy Wilson White was a man of the purest character and the
most exemplary life. He was uncompromising in his stand for what
he felt was right, though never offensive to those opposed to his views.
By his dropping from the ranks, the community suffers a distinct
loss. Such citizens as was he, are too scarce in public life, and the
crying need in private life is for men of such character as was his.
But more notable is the loss occasioned the University by his death.
A foundation had just fairly been laid for a career which must have
redounded greatly to the credit of Roy Wilson White and to the
honor of the University of Pennsylvania. Sad enough to see the
aged professor lay down his life at the end of a career crowded with
the fragrance of duty well done, of service to thousands of loyal and
loving pupils now gone forth to useful lives. Infinitely more sad to
behold a career which promised, and had begun the fulfillment of
such a mission-and much more-cut off in the bud. But even the
foundation rightly and truly builded stands for something positive,
and every friend of Roy White knows that the structure he reared
in his short term of building will stand, and stand for a reminder to
others that it is worth while to have lived and to have lived aright.
0.J.R.
M 1A-3IIM STIIJE~Z D)OMME .
Mr. Dorey was born in Philadelphia, June 8, 1877, the son of
Daniel and Mary Jane Sansom Dorey. He was prepared at Penn
Charter and Brown Preparatory School, and entered Pennsylvania
in 1895, in the Wharton School. Mr. Dorey then entered the Law
Department and took his degree in 1899. He was a member of
Phi Delta Theta fraternity, and was business manager of THE:
AMERICAN L.&w REGISTER during 1898-1899. Mr. Dorey died at
Colorado Springs, April 9 last.
NEGLIGENCE-IABILITY FOR CAUSING DEATH-AcTION OF
DAMAGES. Union Traction (ompany v. Fetters, 99 Fed. Rep. 214
(1900).
In this case some interesting questions of negligence were brought
up before the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, and
the Court, per Dallas, J., showed a gratifying tendency to cease
making qualifications and exceptions and special rules and to get
back to general principles.
The defendant contracted for the construction of a smoke-stack, to
consist of a shell of steel lined with brick. When the contractors
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for the steel part were near the top those for the brick work com-
menced work below, upon the assurance of the defendant (their
chief engineer, more precisely) that the workmen should be protected
from danger from those above by a floor to be constructed above
them. Such a floor was constructed, but the defendant, for a tem-
porary purpose, cut a hole through and subsequently a timber, fall-
ing from above, passed through the floor and killed the plaintiff's
husband, who was a bricklayer working below.
The gist of Judge Dallas' opinion follows: "The refusal of the
(lower) court to rule that under all the evidence the plaintiff was not
entitled to recover, would perhaps be sufficiently supported if rested
upon the ground that the defendant's interference with the platform
amounted to such an assumption of direction and control as to pre-
clude it from asserting that the work was done wholly by an inde-
pendent contractor. Pender v. Raggs, 178 Pa. 337 (1896). But our
judgment rests upon a broader basis. It is not necessary to hold
that the duty of the defendant to exercise reasonable care for the
avoidance of injury to the bricklayer resulted from any doctrine
which is peculiar to the relation of master and servant, for the gen-
eral rule that every one is, in his acts and conduct, bound to be duly
careful to avoid doing hurt to others was made plainly applicable
by the circumstances of this case. Fetters did not go into the stack
as a mere volunteer, but upon the invitation of the defendant, and
in reliance upon its assurance that a protective platform would be
provided to secure his safety. The defendant justified this reliance
by erecting a suitable platform; hut, having done this, its conceded
right to impair the efficiency of the structure, temporarily and lor a
rightful purpose, was coupled with the duty to restore it to its orig-
inal condition within a reasonable time after that purpose had been
accomplished. The question whether the defendant did or did not
discharge this duty and whether, if it did not, the killing of Fetters
resulted from its failure to do so, was properly left to the jury for
dutermination."
A few of the cases cited from Bigelow Cas. Torts (1875), Note
708, may properly be inserted at this juncture: Snow v. Hfousatonic
R. R. Co., 8 Allen 441 (1864); Coombs v. New Bedford Cordage
Co., 102 Mass. 572, 586 (1869); Walsh v. _Pee Valve Co., 110 Mom.
23 (1872); Patterson v. Wallace, 1 Macq. H. L. Cas. 748 (1854);
Bartonshill Coal Co. v. Reid, 3 Macq. H. L. Cas. 266 (1858); Mel-
lors v. Shaw, 1 Best & S. 437 (1861); Ashworth v. Stamvix, 30 L.
J. Q. B. 183 (1861) ; O'Byrne v. Barne, 16 Ct. Sess. Cas. (2d series)
1025 (1854); Bartonshill Coal Co. v. McGuire, 3 Macq. H. L. Cas.
300 (1858) ; Roberts v. Smith, 2 Hurl. & N. 213 (1857) ; Williams
v. Clough, 3 Hurl. & N. 258 (1858); Behrens v. G. N. R. R. Co.,
6 Hurl. & N. 365 (1861); Grizzle v. Frost, 3 Fost. & F. 622 (1863);
Skipp v. E. C. R. R. Co., 9 Ex. 223 (1853); Watling v. Oastler, L.
R. 6 Ex. 73 (1871).
' Such a decision needs but little comment, the excellence of its
reasoning and its wise adherence to first principles is self-sufficient.
The decision may be regarded as marking a new line of cases, but,
as we said at the outset, it shows a gratifying tendency to get back
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to first principles. If does credit alike to the court which uttered it
and to the judge who framed it.
NATIONAL BANEs; ASSESSMENT ON STOCKHOLDERS; CONCLU-
SIVENESS OP COMPTROLLER'S AcTIoN.-The question of the con-
clusiveness of assessments levied on stockholders of national banks
that have failed, though seemingly well settled, was again brought
up in Aldrich v. Campbell, 97 Fed. 663, (1899). Campbell was a
shareholder in the Tacoma National Bank to the extent of one hun-
dred shares. In December, 1894, the bank closed its doors, and the
appellant, Aldrich, was subsequently duly appointed receiver by the
Comptroller of the Currency, after the resignation of Anderson,
his predecessor in the receivership. In April, 1895, upon a proper
accounting, made by the receiver of the bank to the Comp-
troller, and upon a valuation of the uncollected assets remaining in
the receiver's hands, it appeared to the satisfaction of the Comp-
troller of the Currency that in order to pay the debts of the
bank it would be necessary to enforce the individual liability of the
stockholders thereof as prescribed by the Revised Statutes of the
United States, sections 5151 and 5234. Accordingly an assessment of
sixty-five dollars a share was levied upon the stockholders. This
assessment Campbell paid. A further assessment of seventeen dol-
lars per share he refused to pay, alleging that there were funds enough
in the receiver's hands to pay the bank's liabilities. The receiver
.hen commenced an action at law against him, whereupon he filed
this bill in equity, alleging the facts as above stated, and alleging also
that he could not interpose these facts in defending the action at
law; he concluded by praying for an interlocutory order restraining
Aldrich from prosecuting the action. Aldrich filed a demurrer to
this bill, which was overruled and Campbell's application granted,
whereupon this appeal was taken.
In reversing the lower court, Circuit Judge Morrow said: "It is
well established that the Comptroller of the Currency is vested, by
virtue of the national banking law, with authority to determine
when it is necessary, in winding up the affairs of an insolvent bank,
to enforce the liability of the stockholders, and power to levy assess-
ments accordingly; that such determination andany action thereon
are conclusive upon the stockholdersand not to be questioned in
any litigation that may ensue. Kennedy v. Gibson, 8 Wall 498,
(1869) ; Casey v. Galli, 94 U. S. 673, (1876) ; Bank v. Case, 99 U. S.
628, (1878); Richmond v. Irons, 121 U. S. 27, 7 Sup. Ct. 788,
(1887) ; Bushnell v. Lsland, 164 U. S. 684, 17 Sup. Ct. 209, (1897) ;
Bank v. Mathews, 29 C. C. A. 491, 85 Fed. 934, (1898); Nead v.
Tall, 70 Fed. 806 (1895) ; Young v. Wemipe, 46 Fed. 354, (1891) ;
Welles v. Stout, 38 Fed. 67, (1889); Aldrich v. Yates, 95 Fed. 78,
(1899)."
In Kennedy v. Gibson, supra, at page 505, it was said by Justice
Swayne, speaking for the court, "It is for the Comptroller to decide
when it is necessary to institute proceedings against the stockholders
to enforce their personal liability, and whether a whole or a part,
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and if only a part, how much shall be collected. These questions
are referred to his judgment and discretion; and his determination
is conclusive. The stockholders cannot controvert it. It is not to
be questioned in the litigation that may ensue. He may make it at
such time as he may deem proper, and upon such data as shall
be satisfactory to him." This case was decided in 1869, shortly
of the passage of the national banking laws, and has been followed
in every case since that time.
"The appellee in the present case does not deny the authority of
the Comptroller as declared by the above decisions, but he seeks to
avoid the effect of such authority by contending that while, in an
action on the part of a receiver of a national bank to recover an
assessment, no defence can be interposed by the stockholder to such
an action, however excessive and wrongful the assessment may be,
nevertheless the stockholder in such a case may restrain the receiver
by a bill in equity to enjoin such action. In support of this conten-
tion he relies upon an observation of Mr. Justice Swayne in deliver-
ing the opinion in U. S. v. Knox, 102 U. S. 422, (1880). 'Although
assessments made by the Comptroller, under the circumstances of
first assessment in this case, and all other assessments, successive or
otherwise, not exceeding the par value of all the stock of the bank,
are conclusive upon the stockholders, yet if he were to attempt to
enforce one made. clearly and palpably, contrary to the views we
have expressed, it cannot be doubted that a court of equity, if its aid
were invoked, would promptly restrain him by injunction.'"
The court disposes of this contention by pointing out, first, that
the Supreme Court of the United States in this case said that noth-
ing in their opinion was intended to affect the authority of Kennedy
v. Gibson and Casey v. Galli, which they distinctly affirmed; sec-
ondly, that the stockholders in the Knox case were some of them
insolvent, and that to levy a second assessment would be to make
the solvent stockholders liable for the insolvent, a liability distinctly
repudiated by the Revised Statutes of the United States. "This
last statement, as to what a court of equity would do, was limited
to the facts of that case (the Knox case), and clearly ought not to
be extended to facts of a wholly different character."
While the court here very clearly distinguishes Justice Swayne's
dicta, yet the Supreme Court of the United States has never touched
upon it. It might be that in a particular, though perhaps isolated
case, the Comptroller might exceed his lawful rights and authority,
it would then be hard indeed were any court to bold that equity
could not review his decision. In our opinion equity would do so.
We do not mean by this to criticise the decision in the case at bar,
for upon all the facts it was well considered and ably rendered.
BANKRuPTcY; ", FIDUCIARY CAPACITY" AND " MISAPPROPRI-
ATIOx."-The case of in Re Basch (November, 1899), 97 Fed.
761, deciding that a debt owed by a commission merchant
to his principal for goods consigned to be sold on commission, is not
a debt created by "fraud, misappropriation or defalcation, or while
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acting in a fiduciary capacity," within § 17 of the Bankrupt
Act, disposed in a summary manner of a point which was a fruitfhl
source of discussion under the Acts of 1841 and 1867.
Under the present Act the only new question which can arise is
as to the meaning of the word "misappropriation"; for the inter-
pretation of the words "fraud" and " fiduciary capacity" must be
regarded as having been definitely settled under both of the prior
Acts. Chapmam v. Forsyth, 2 How. 202 (1844), construing the
Act of 1841, decided that "fiduciary capacity" included only
technical trusts ; and that the debt of a cotton factor to his principal
was released by a discharge. The Act of 1867, § 34, dealing
with discharges, did not enumerate specific trusts, as did the Act of
1841, but its phraseology was almost identical with § 17, subdiv. 4,
of the present Act. This portion of the Act of 1867 was disposed
of in .Hennequin v. Clews, 111 U. S., 676 (1883), wherein it was
held that damages arising from the conversion by a pledgee of the
property pledged to him, did not constitute a debt created by
"fraud" or by one "while acting in a fiduciary character." In
view of the similarity between the last and the present Acts this
ruling, it seems, should be final.
In construing the word "misappropriation" in Re Baseh the
Court said, "the term 'misappropriation' in the present Act is
even less appropriate to the transaction sued on than the term" fidu-
ciary capacity'; and the reasoning in the cases cited [Chapnan v.
Forsytjh; Hlennequin v. Clews, supra; Neal v. Clark, 95 U. S. 704
(1877) ] that excludes the latter, excludes the former also."
Neal v. Clark decided that in the Act of 1867, "fraud" meant
positive fraud, or fraud in fact, involving moral turpitude or inten-
tional wrong, and not implied fraud, or fraud in law. The ruling
was based upon the fact that it was grouped with the words
"defalcation" and "embezzlement," and that they all referred to
kindred acts.
Although the decision in the present case cannot be considered as
final, and it is not unlikely that there will by a variety of adjudica-
tions on the same point, yet as in Re Basch follows in the light of
the strong judicial reasoning enunciated in the Supreme Court, it
seems that it ought to stand.
